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Iranian Ulama & the CIA: The Key Alliance
Behind the 1953 Iranian Coup D’état
By Anthony Lucey
Abstract: Much of the anger and hatred that is a part of USIranian relations, which has exploded onto the world stage since
the Iranian Revolution of 1979, stems from the 1953 coup d’état
which removed Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq1
from power. A large field of scholarly work has been dedicated to
the 1953 coup, specifically surrounding the participation of US
and British intelligence. However, one interesting and surprising
aspect of the 1953 coup which has not been sufficiently
investigated is the role of Iranian religious clerics, known in Iran
as the ulama, in assisting the CIA and their Iranian sub-agents in
carrying out the overthrow of their own country’s democratically
elected prime minister. As new documents are released, we can
refine our understanding of the complex dynamics and array of
participants in this event. Further illuminating this history is
particularly relevant because it is the ulama that leads the 1979
Revolution and establishes a new government.

It is August 19, 1953 in Iran’s capital city of Tehran.
Demonstrators are in the streets looting, rioting, chanting, and
protesting. Beautiful mosques, main government and office
1

Various spellings of the name Mohammad Mossadeq are used in this article.
All references made by the author are spelled as above, but spellings used by
other scholars (when quoted or in the titles of their work) may differ, most
common being the spelling Mosaddeq.
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buildings are being demolished and a local Tudeh (Iran’s
Communist Party) theater and office equipment are burned to the
ground. The demonstrators continue their march and attack local
newspaper offices, leaving them in ruins. Trucks and buses now
arrive flooding the streets with local tribesmen from surrounding
areas who join the madness. The will of the people becomes too
much, and soon the occupying army units join the movement.
Civilians and soldiers, side by side, proceed to take over the main
squares of the city and ultimately seize the broadcasting facilities
of Radio Tehran. This historic Persian city has officially erupted
into total chaos. Tremendous fear from local families caught in the
fray fills the air. The demonstrations seem to have taken on a life
of their own as they continuously grow in size. The mob moves on
to take over the telegraph office, the foreign ministry, press and
propaganda bureau, the police and army headquarters. Finally, they
come to the home of the man who is the ostensible cause for all of
the mayhem, their Prime Minister, Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq. A
battle breaks out between Mossadeq's supporters and the antiMossadeq crowds, leaving hundreds of people dead on the streets.
The overthrow is now complete, and later the same day Army
General Fazlollah Zahedi announces that he is Iran’s new Prime
Minister and that his forces now control the city.2 At the time, and
for many years following the coup d’état which overthrew Prime
Minister Mossadeq almost no one, outside of British and US
intelligence and their Iranian operatives and collaborators, would
have ever dreamed that this horrific scene was entirely fabricated,
designed, and orchestrated by a new world power—the United
States of America and their top intelligence agency, the CIA. Hard
to believe as it might be, this is no movie scene, but a sad narrative
that lies at the heart of modern US-Iranian relations.
This research seeks to shed light on the relationship
between the CIA and prominent Islamic religious figures and their
participation in the 1953 Iranian coup. This work will draw much
2

Mark J. Gasiorowski, "The CIA's TPBEDAMN Operation and the 1953 Coup
in Iran." Journal of Cold War Studies 15, no. 4 (2013): 20.
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of its information from declassified CIA documents like CIA
Operative Dr. Donald Wilber’s contemporary historical account
titled “Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952 –
August 1953,” CIA Historian Claud Corrigan’s “The Battle for
Iran,” CIA Staff Historian Steve Koch’s more recent CIA history
titled “Zendebad Shah!,” as well as the newly declassified British
memorandums titled “Persia: Political Review of the Recent
Crisis,” which provides key information regarding the payoffs of
Iranian clerics by the CIA as well the expectations the CIA held for
those clerics in return for said payoffs, the actions taken by both
the CIA and key members of the Ulama, and the roles played by
prominent groups and individuals throughout the major sectors of
Iranian society. This research aims to deepen and enhance our
understanding of the inner workings of the CIA, their role within
the unfortunate tale of the 1953 coup, the motivating factors
behind the CIA involvement, as well as the contributions of Iran’s
own religious elites towards the toppling of Dr. Mossadeq.
The first portion of this research will provide a deep
historical context of the events leading up to the ousting of Prime
Minister Mossadeq from office with the aim of providing sufficient
background to facilitate the understanding required to make sense
of this complicated course of events. First, it is necessary to return
to the beginning in1901 with the notorious D’Arcy oil concession
of Iranian oil rights to the British, continue into the early 1950s
with the nationalization of Iranian oil, and conclude with the
unfolding of the coup itself. The second portion of this study will
focus on Mohammad Mossadeq himself, providing a background
on the type of man he was and the positions he stood so strongly
for. In this section we will also look into why the US and Britain
both wanted to remove Mossadeq and their motivations for
conducting the coup. This segment also aims to cover the regional
and economic goals desired from the removal of Mossadeq and the
consequences that followed. The third section of this paper will
provide a background on the ulama, their role within Iranian
society, and possible motivations for their participation in the
coup. Section four will inquire into the relationship between the
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CIA and members of the Ulama as well as their direct involvement
through forming and implementing anti-Mossadeq street
demonstrations, by using their influence in the political realm in
Iran, in exchange for bribes in the form of cash as well as potential
backing for power positions within the Iranian government, and by
filtering “black” and “gray” propaganda through the mosques and
their religious circles in hopes of toppling Mossadeq. This research
will also help to show the inner workings of the CIA at this time
and other activities they carried out in congruence with ulama
networking and bribery that facilitated the coup. Lastly, I will
introduce and analyze the primary source documents from the CIA
and British Intelligence (MI6) that give context to the entire
process of the coup as well as irrefutable, incriminating evidence
of the CIA utilizing money to bribe influential Iranian clerics into
participating in the 1953 Iranian coup.
This work could not come at a time of greater importance
in regard to current US-Iranian relations and is necessary to
highlight the gravity of the effects that the decisions of today’s
American leaders might have on Iran’s people, just as the decisions
made by those in power back in 1953 have continued to have
unforeseen consequences over the last 66 years. Current US regime
change efforts in Venezuela should be viewed in much the same
way, with the understanding that such efforts will carry with them
their own set of long-lasting undesirable results. According to
United States Secretary of State Mike Pompeo when discussing
current US efforts in Iran, “It’s not about changing the regime, it’s
about changing the behavior of the leadership in Iran to comport
with what the Iranian people really want them to do.”3 While
current US leadership under the Trump administration knows the
history of the 1953 coup in Iran and the tremendous blowback it
has caused well enough to know to change their verbiage when
publicly discussing their current attempt at regime change in Iran,
3

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Pompeo: U.S. Looks to Change Iranian
Behavior, Not Regime” (May 25, 2018). https://www.rferl.org/a/pompeo-u-slooks-to-change-iranian-behavior-not-regime/29251208.html
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their actions and their intentions have changed very little. This is
not surprising as the current leadership in Iran was born out of the
1979 Revolution which itself came out of the ashes of the CIA-led
1953 coup. This has further entrenched both sides against one
another and has created an unending closed circuit of hatred and a
distaste for coming to a mature, mutual understanding. The United
States is continuing their aims to control Iranian Oil through the
use of extremely harsh sanctions and by stopping the majority of
Iran’s oil clients from doing business with them. Through this kind
of an economic chokehold the US hopes to make life so miserable
and unbearable for the Iranian people by causing mass forced
starvation and a total depletion of life’s necessary resources that
the Iranian citizens will rise up and overthrow their current
government themselves. So, while the United States may not
openly admit to attempting to force a regime change in Iran, this is
without a doubt their one true goal.4 We may not know exactly
how today’s actions against Iran will play out over the coming
years, but we do have the ability to use 1953 as a lesson which if
understood correctly, could drastically and positively change and
even save the lives of the Iranian people today and could shape
future US-Iranian relations for many generations to come.
While the 1953 coup was born out of the Anglo-Iranian Oil
crisis, it is necessary to go back a further 50 years and examine
British-Iranian history to find its roots. Coming second in size and
breadth only to the Reuter concession of 1872, a British oil
prospector named William Knox D’Arcy was responsible for one
of the largest and internationally most significant purchases of
natural resources in world history, known as the infamous D’Arcy
Concession of 1901. D’Arcy made an agreement with the Iranian
monarch, Mozaffar al-Din Shah, for the exclusive rights to explore,
extract, refine, and export all oil products that spanned the entire
nation of Iran for the next 60 years, with the exception of a few
4

If this route were to be successful, the United States would be able to push the
blame onto the actions or inactions of the regime leadership, rather than where it
should be; on the United States government.

115

Iranian Ulama and the CIA

small regions bordering Russia.5 The shah handed over all of his
country’s rights to what would become their largest and most
valuable resource for only £50,000 directly into the shah’s pocket,
another £20,000 in shares to be spread amongst other key Iranian
political elites, and an agreement to pay the Iranian government a
total of 16 percent of net annual profits. It wasn’t until 1908 that
oil was first discovered in Masjed-e Suleiman in the province now
known as Khuzestan. Not long after oil was struck, D’Arcy
decided to sell his rights to the Burmah Oil Company, controlled
by representatives of the British government, which later took on
the name of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC).6
At this time in history, as it still is today, oil became of the
utmost importance to the British. Unable to produce oil of their
own, the British, led by the “oil maniac” Lord Admiral John
Fisher, were set on converting the British Navy away from coal
power to petroleum power.7 With these changes in mind, the
British were able to secure 52.5 percent of the voting rights within
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Along with majority voting
rights, the British government held two director positions within
the company, giving them the right to veto any decisions made by
the Board of Directors.8 With what amounted to basically full
control over the APOC, the British were set to reap tremendous
profits from Iran’s oil since they could control the price and
output.9 In 1912 the British entrenched themselves even further
into the region by linking their major oil well in Masjid-e Suleiman
with a pipeline to an island in the Persian Gulf known as Abadan.10
The British were able to convince the chief of the largest Arab5

Amin Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1980), 13.
6
Ervand Abrahamian, The Coup: 1953, The CIA and the Roots of Modern U.S.Iranian Relations (New York: New Press, 2013), 18.
7
Ibid., 5.
8
Ibid., 18.
9
The higher the output of oil by the British government means the lower the
price, therefore even though they are still profiting, Iran is getting fewer
royalties and more resource exploitation.
10
Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, 13.
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speaking tribe in all of the southwest region, Sheihk Kha’zal, the
leader of Abadan, to allow them to build the largest oil refinery in
the world, allowing Britain to turn Iranian oil into a major export
sector. The APOC quickly began producing more than 357,000
barrels of oil per day, cementing themselves within the rankings of
the Seven Sisters of oil who held a virtual monopoly over the
worldwide oil industry.11 This resulted in more than £24 million a
year in taxes and £92 million in foreign exchange for the British
and as figured by the Ministry of Fuel and Power, the Abadan
refinery alone was bringing in more than $347 million per year.12
These numbers greatly eclipsed what the Iranian government was
receiving in the form of taxes, royalties and profit sharing. 13
Not surprisingly, the success of the APOC and the British
in the mass production of oil within Iran began to cause some
serious public discontent, but with the Abadan oil refinery
producing enough fuel to cover 85 percent of Britain’s Royal Navy
and Royal Air Force’s needs in Asia, public discontent would
hardly be enough to stop the British imperial enterprise.14 Not only
were the Iranian people angered by the negligible profits they were
being given by the British from the production of Iranian oil, while
the British government and the APOC’s investors were raking in
tens of millions of pounds per year, they were also tired of the
racism and exploitation of Iranian locals working for the APOC by
the British management and leading officials. They were refused
full-time positions and instead were hired as temporary contract
laborers to limit job security. Iranian workers were forced to live in
Shantytowns, while the European employees enjoyed superior
housing. The Iranians were looked down upon and referred to as
“wogs,” a derogatory and racist British term and were also kept out
of management positions. Iranian anger and frustration continued
11

The Seven Sisters of the oil industry consisted of: Exxon, Mobil, Chevron,
Gulf Oil, Texaco, British Petroleum, and Shell.
12
Abrahamian, The Coup, 18.
13
Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, 14.
14
Abrahamian, The Coup, 19.
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to build as they realized they had no real control or say over their
country’s most valuable resource.15 Iran was going through an
immense economic collapse and the Iranian people were greatly
impoverished, as the British continued to collect most of Iran’s oil
profits. ARAMCO reaching a 50/50 deal with Saudi Arabia in
December 1950 would be the last straw for Iran.16 In 1951, with
their unrest boiling over, the Iranians turned to their members of
Parliament, who in turn looked to Mohammad Mossadeq to do
something about their predicament.17
By the time he had taken power as Prime Minister in 1951,
he was already an elderly man at seventy years of age and had
been a member of the Iranian Parliament, known as the Majlis, for
many years. Mossadeq was a strong believer in the power of
parliament and the checks and balances this placed over the Shah’s
control. In his eyes, the Shah was meant to reign over Iran, but not
to have unlimited power and control. He also believed that the
police and military were meant to serve the people, not the Shah.
In fact, his goal was to limit the authority of the Shah, and to move
the majority of power to the Majlis. He fought for constitutional
democracy and stood for freedom of the press, something he knew
would never be possible under the total control of the Shah.18
Mossadeq was intensely opposed to British Imperialism and was a
prominent Iranian Nationalist with a proven track record. He was
considered an incorruptible man by his contemporaries, known for
being relentless in his aspirations, maintaining unwavering
positions regardless of risk, for being truly stubborn in his efforts
to improve his country, and for working towards Iranian prosperity
and independence with a vision based on Iran first, all else second.
15

Stephen Kinzer, All The Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of
Middle Eastern Terror (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003), 2.
16
Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power: with a
New Epilogue (Free Press, 2009), 432-437.
17
Kinzer, All The Shah’s Men, 2.
18
Wm. Roger Louis, “Britain and the Overthrow of the Mosaddeq
Government,” in Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, eds. Mark
Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, 126-177 (Syracuse: Syracuse University
Press, 2004), 127.
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Western-educated and with a deep understanding of
Western politics, Mossadeq was a very Westernized individual, but
strongly rejected the Western policies of imperialism and foreign
intervention, especially in his beloved homeland.19 Much of
Mossadeq’s policy and the motivation behind his actions stemmed
from the British and Russian occupation of Iran over Iranian Oil,
not once but twice, in less than a fifty-year period. Sharing in the
feelings of his fellow countrymen, Mossadeq was ready to end this
pattern. In 1949 he began constructing a plan to nationalize Iran’s
oil industry and headed an alliance known as the National Front,
which consisted of Majlis from most of the political parties within
Iran, including a prominent member of the Ulama, known as
Ayatollah Sayyed Abol Qasem Kashani. While constructing his
plan for the nationalization of oil, Iranian anger toward the APOC
gained strength and momentum. The British finally agreed to
renegotiate the terms of their concession agreement to increase
Iran’s portion of the APOC profits from the 16 percent they were
getting to about double that, but these actions proved to be too
little and much too late.20 ARAMCO, the American owned oil
company working in the Persian Gulf, negotiated 50/50 concession
deals with both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for their oil rights. This
meant that ARAMCO would keep 50 percent of their profits and
give 50 percent to each accordingly.2122 Mossadeq and the Majlis
19

Ali Rahnema, Behind the 1953 Coup in Iran: Thugs, Turncoats, Soldiers, and
Spooks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 11.
20
Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, 38.
21
Abrahamian, The Coup, 20.
22
Venezuela had also reached a 50/50 split deal with the United States in 1943
on the production of their oil. Much like Iran today, Venezuela is also suffering
the effects of harsh US sanctions affecting their ability to export oil in an effort
to remove President Nicolas Maduro and change the regime, just as they did
with the 1953 Iranian coup. In an interview with Fox Business, US National
Security Advisor John Bolton made the intentions of the US clear when he
stated: “We’re in conversation with major American companies now. I think
we’re trying to get to the same end result here. … It will make a big difference
to the United States economically if we could have American oil companies
really invest in and produce the oil capabilities in Venezuela.”
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fought for a 50/50 agreement in Iran, but the British thought this to
be ridiculous and much more than they were willing to offer.
Mossadeq and the National Front would not sit by and allow this to
go on. On April 30, 1951, the Majlis voted Mossadeq in as the new
Prime Minister of Iran. It was only one day later, on May 1, 1951,
that Prime Minister Mossadeq officially nationalized Iranian oil,
seizing Britain’s most profitable business in the world.23
As expected, the British were outraged with this
course of events and were determined to return to the way they
were pre-Mossadeq. Britain openly and publicly rejected Iran’s oil
nationalization as completely illegal, as they believed that they had
a valid contract with Iran for their oil, and had built, invested in
and ran the oil field operations. The British first tried to fight
Mossadeq at the United Nations and the International Court of
Justice, but both attempts were unsuccessful. Britain proceeded to
withdraw their advisors from Iran, froze Iranian funds from being
converted in English banks, and issued harsh sanctions against the
country.24 The British then took things much further, and
introduced gunboat diplomacy by sending warships into the
Persian Gulf. They set up a blockade so that any Iranian oil that
was shipped out would be stopped and confiscated as the
possession of APOC and Britain. They also made an agreement
with the other major powers of the oil world, stating that none of
them would step in and enter an agreement with Iran to purchase,
process, or ship their oil. Both APOC and ARAMCO agreed to
increase their oil production two-fold in Kuwait, Iraq, and Saudi
Arabia in order to offset the missing oil from Iran. This had severe
negative effects on Iran’s economy by reducing their oil
production from 241.4 million barrels in 1950 to 10.6 million
barrels in 1952, and their oil income to almost nothing. The Soviet
Union saw this as a possible opportunity to form an alliance with
Mossadeq and the nation of Iran and offered their support for his

23
24

Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, 39.
Abrahamian, The Coup, 47.
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nationalist views.25 Soviet support would prove a crucial
component in the way the remainder of this story unfolds.
While both the United States and Britain were worried that
the Iranian nationalization of oil could result in a weakened ability
to control worldwide oil prices and would give Iran the power to
hold onto its oil and control worldwide prices it was Britain who
was far more concerned with turning back the hands of time than
the United States.26 The British knew that they would need US
cooperation and backing against Iran to regain control over their
oil. Unfortunately for the British, US President Harry Truman was
more or less opposed to imperialism and the old way of doing
things. Truman urged the British earlier on to come to a 50/50 deal
with Iran, which was now too little, too late, but he himself did not
like the idea of full nationalization of Iran’s oil industry as he
believed this would have disastrous effects for the US and Britain
around the world concerning other peripheralized oil-producing
nations. Though keen on having the British come to an agreement
with Iran, Truman remained opposed to the use direct military
force and the use of covert operations to bring down Premier
Mossadeq.
Nevertheless, at this time the US government was focused
on the Cold War and American society was experiencing the
height of the Red Scare and McCarthyism. The main concern for
the US was not so much Britain’s plight over oil but was focused
on Soviet influence in Iran and their potential for becoming a
Communist country. Luckily for the British, Truman was coming
to the end of his final term in office, and would soon be replaced
by President Eisenhower. Britain rather brilliantly decided to play
upon the fears of the United States and especially President
Eisenhower, who was at the same time being influenced by the
new Secretary of State, and anti-communist hardliner, John Foster
Dulles. With the economic situation in Iran deteriorating, the US
believed that Mossadeq could inadvertently allow Iran to slide into
25

Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, 40-41.
It is important to remember that the US has indigenous sources of oil but
Great Britain has none.

26
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the Communist camp and could be replaced by a leader of Iran’s
Communist Tudeh Party. Unlike the Americans, the British
believed that if Mossadeq was removed there was a good chance
that they could implement a pro-Western conservative government
led by an Iranian monarch, but they would need the Americans
help to accomplish this..27 Britain then began implementing their
scheme of using American panic and frenzy revolving around
Communism against them. According to British Intelligence Agent
C.M. Woodhouse:
I went to Washington with the permission of
Anthony Eden, and I put it to the Americans that
there was a very serious Communist threat against
Iran. The Americans were not hard to convince.
There was a general fear of Communism in the
early 1950s which it was not hard to play on.28
This approach was incredibly effective and helped move
Eisenhower into an anti-Mossadeq position. Eisenhower then
agreed to enter into a joint CIA-SIS operation under the codename
TPAJAX to support the opposition movement in Iran and take out
Mossadeq. The American and British led 1953 coup of the
democratically elected Prime Minister of Iran had officially begun
on July 11, 1953.29
The Role of the Ulama in Iranian Society and their Motivation
for Participation in the Coup
Iran offers a long, rich, and complex history of religious
development and spiritual teachings dating back to pre-Islamic
27

Wm. Roger Louis, “Britain and the Overthrow,” 154.
William Cran and Daniel Yergin. “The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money,
& Power.” YouTube Video, 44:06, July 8, 2016,
www.youtube.com/watch?v=mM7O3rbgqxc&t=2761s.
29
CIA Clandestine Service History, "Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran,
November 1952-August 1953," by Donald Wilber (March 1954): 18.
28
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times, some of whose ideas have continued into and influenced
Islam today. From Zoroastrianism to Manichaeism, much of Iran’s
religious background and conditioning is based upon a dualistic
struggle between the forces of good and evil, represented by a
good deity and an evil power, where good is meant to be
victorious. This theme of righteous warfare between good and evil,
or justice and oppression, along with the exaltation of martyr
figures, are found in pre-Islamic religions and have held their place
in society well into the modern Islamic period. It took a number of
social revolts at the beginning of the Islamic period in the seventh
century to combine these pre-Islamic ideas with Islamic beliefs.30
These fundamental beliefs are so infused within Iranian society
because they mirror the daily struggle of injustice and inequality
faced by the middle and lower classes of Iran throughout much of
their history and provide much of the motivation necessary to give
one’s life for a cause.
However, it was not until the arrival of the Prophet
Mohammad in early seventh century Arabia that politics and
religion became intertwined, with a number of his revelations
being political or legal in form. It was around this time, during the
second half of the seventh century that Islam spread to Persia, but
it would not be until the sixteenth century that Shia Islam would
become the official state religion.31 Within Iranian society Ulama
members have the responsibility to handle matters concerning
Islamic law and education, providing them with further social
control, but more importantly greater reliance on them by Iran’s
citizens. This reliance on religion and the Ulama by the Iranian
population for spiritual, economic, and social guidance and
prosperity has placed enormous power into the hands of Iran’s elite
religious clerics. They are looked to as force of good against the
evil oppressors, whomever they may be at the time. This,
30

Nikki R. Keddie and Yann Richard, Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive
History of Modern Iran (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 2-7.
The revolts were often carried out by the descendants of Ali or by men who lead
revolts in his name, against the Umayyad caliphs.
31
Ibid., 5-9.
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especially because they are Shiites, is why it is so shocking to find
out that a number of these religious elites, who their people trusted
and relied on so heavily to act in their best interests, worked hand
in hand with the CIA, in exchange for bribes of money and
political positions of power, to overthrow Iran’s Prime Minister
who was dedicated to bettering the lives of his people.
Shia Islam
Following the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 A.D., the
Islamic community split into two groups based on who they
believed to be the next valid leader. One group chose
Muhammad’s close friend Abu Bakr and the line of Caliphs that
followed. This community became known as Sunni Muslims. The
other group believed that the line of succession should have passed
to Muhammad’s descendant, his cousin and son-in-law Ali, this
group became known as the Shiate Ali (partisans of Ali) later
shortened to Shia Muslims. After Ali’s death his firstborn son
Hasan resigned from his position of authority, and Ali’s second
son Hosain claimed this leadership role, but was soon thereafter
massacred by armed forces of the Umayyad Caliph Yazid in 680
A.D at Karbala, Iraq. One of Hosain’s sons survived the massacre
and was able to continue on the line of Imams, which is the
honorific title given to this line of descendants of Mohammad.32
The son of the eleventh Imam following this line of descendants
one day suddenly disappeared and went into occultation. The
followers of this line are known as “Twelvers” and believe that the
twelfth Imam will one day reappear similar to the Judeo-Christian
messiah.33 Following the occultation of the twelfth Imam, it is

32

Ibid., 6-7.
Ibid., 7-8. A split occurred with the sons of the Sixth Imam, Ja’far as-Sadeq,
where one group of Shi’is followed one of his son’s name Isma’il, and this
group became known as the “Seveners.” The other group decided to follow
another of Ja’far’s sons and believed that the infant son of the Eleventh Imam on
this line of succession, who had disappeared, went into was is called

33
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believed that there is no infallible interpreter or leader until his
return when he is to come back and bring with him perfection and
perfect justice.34 There was a strong belief within the Islamic
community of Iran that the Imams held far greater knowledge and
power than did any government or political ruler, leading to the
belief that members of the Ulama, in the absence of the twelfth
Imam, are far more qualified to interpret the will of the Imam than
any political ruler can ever be, giving religious rulers great
political influence and control.35 The disappearance of the twelfth
Imam allowed the community to be quiescent generally as they
would accept and support royal, local, political, and military rule
until his coveted return.
From the time of Mohammad there were three primary
sources where Muslims could find answers to the everyday
problems pertaining to social, political, and legal life. The first and
most authoritative option was the Quran itself, which is understood
as the word of God, which came down through the Prophet
Mohammad himself. The second source is known as the hadith,
which are the recorded words and practices of Mohammad
throughout his life. The third option was to listen to the consensus
of the leading Islamic scholars and jurists. These three sources
covered many of life’s issues, but there were many parts of modern
life that were not necessarily covered in the Quran or the hadith.
Without a living Imam to provide infallible instruction to the
people, how were they meant to handle many of life’s most
important issues while staying true to their faith? How were they to
interpret these divinely inspired sources, the Quran and hadith?
This problem led to the creation of a specialty within Islamic
scholarship, mujtahids (members of the Ulama trained to interpret
the Quran and hadith), who are scholars and theologians who
possess high levels of intelligence and have dedicated their lives to
religious training and study, making them the most qualified to
“occultation” in the ninth century, leaving not another Imam, but rather four
interpreters of his will.
34
Ibid., 8.
35
Ibid., 9.
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provide judgments on a wide range of topics.36 Originally there
was quite a strong alliance between the mujtahids and the political
leaders, but this would not last due to the increasing wealth and
power of the Ulama.
Within the Muslim world there is a process where a person,
upon death, can leave their property or can offer it as a charitable
donation to the “church”, in what is known as a vaqf, or an
inalienable endowment that cannot be taken or taxed by the
government. Charitable vaqfs, usually in the form of land, are
given to help fund and run schools, hospitals, mosques, and any
other institution, which are run by the Ulama.37 Even the private
vaqfs that are given must go through the Ulama, who are paid
through the vaqf revenues. As the government cannot ever seize
these contributions, the wealth and power in the hands of the ulama
grew greater along with their spiritual and legal duties and
responsibilities. This placed the Ulama in a position where they
could potentially challenge the authority of the government and
had the backing to do so.38 On top of the vaqfs the Ulama also
controlled religious taxes and performed community services for a
fee like weddings, that did not have to go through the government.
These funds were meant to go strictly to helping the poor and
running the welfare institutions but in reality increased the wealth
of the religious classes dramatically.39 With this wealth and new
independence from the Iranian government, the power of the
mujtahids grew even further as they gave the people interpretations
of religious law in response to the problems of modern life that
were so desperately needed.40 The Ulama almost effectively made
the Shahs and Iranian leadership unnecessary in the lives of the
regular everyday people in Iran, as they received most of what they
needed both physically and spiritually from their religious leaders.
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The power and influence held by the Ulama within Iranian society
had been set in stone from this point on.
Development of the Coup
Arguably the most important religious figure, who was very
politically involved during the 1940s-50s, and a part of
Mossadeq’s National Front, was the fervently anti-British
Ayatollah Sayyed Abol Qasem Kashani. Kashani was the speaker
of the Majlis and at first a close colleague of Mossadeq’s.41 He
maintained a growing influence with the Iranian people, especially
after the oil crisis, and was known to have ties to a terrorist
fundamentalist group by the name of the Feda’iyan-e Islam.42
Kashani had a long history of what was considered subversive
behavior by the British and well as the Pahlavi regime. He took
part in the 1920 Shi’a Revolt against the British as a young man,
was arrested by the British for having links to the Germans in
1944-45 and was arrested once again in 1946 for organizing
protests in opposition to the rigging of the fifteenth Majlis
elections. In 1949, Kashani was arrested after his photographer
shot Mohammad Reza Shah, injuring but not killing him, and was
later exiled to Beirut. Kashani was not allowed back into Iran until
June of 1950 after he won a seat in the sixteenth Majlis. Even
though he was in exile for some time, Kashani still maintained his
connections and influence over the Tehran bazaar.4344
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While playing the role of religious leader on the outside,
the controversial cleric was not opposed to breaking his assumed
moral code when it came to maintaining his power or increasing
his bank account. After Ahmad Qavam failed to take control of the
Majlis, Mossadeq’s political influence was stronger than ever.
Using this power and popularity, Mossadeq moved to limit his
former supporter, Kashani, and his ability to intervene in his plans.
Kashani, as well as his close allies and influential members of the
National Front, Baqa’I and Makki, began to see their political
influence slip away.45 These three men, along with a few of their
allies came together and created a parliamentary group whose aim
was to limit Mossadeq’s authority. In January of 1953, Mossadeq
asked parliament to increase his legislative powers for another
year, which would allow him to issue reforms immediately without
going through parliament. Kashani took this opportunity to fight
Mossadeq within parliament, stating that this was opposed by
Iran’s Constitution. This did not work out the way Kashani had
planned as the people of Iran went on strike in support of
Mossadeq, chanting “Mossadeq or death” bringing business to a
standstill. The Majlis listened to their constituents and voted in
favor of Mossadeq almost unanimously. This was an embarrassing
defeat for Kashani and his allies. Additionally, the very next day
Mossadeq replaced one of Kashani’s closest allies, Chief of Police
Colonel Kamal, which was another major blow to Kashani’s
political stature.46 Kashani began to realize that fighting Mossadeq
politically or legally was almost impossible, but this did not deter
him. Ayatollah Kashani had been embarrassed and could feel his
power slipping through his grasp. This was enough to motivate
Ulama’s income was paid by the guilds in exchange for religious services and
duties.
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Kashani and his men to partake in subversive and covert operations
aimed at the removal of Mohammad Mossadeq, in order to
reinstate the level of power he so desperately yearned for. It was at
this point that Kashani and his followers allied with General
Zahedi, the Shah, and the US/British alliance. 47
Traditionally in Iran the Ulama were supporters of the
monarchy, so while Kashani may have been the most prominent
and aggressive cleric involved in Mossadeq’s ousting, he was not
the only one. Another major player in Iran’s religious circle who
took part in overthrowing Iran’s Prime Minister was Ayatollah
Seyyed Mohammad Behbahani. A son of one of the two leading
religious figures in Iran’s constitutional movement, the pro-British
Behbahani became personally close to Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
during the Shah’s rise to power. In fact, the two became so close
that Behbahani came to be the Shah’s religious protector and a
very close ally early on. Even though Behbahani’s position as
Ayatollah ostensibly meant he stood for religious piety and
incorruptibility, he seemingly had no issue accepting funds directly
from the Shah to continue promoting his authority. The Ayatollah
was known to have “the reputation of being quite unscrupulous and
corrupt, ready to sell his influence on the bazaars to the highest
bidder.”48 As the situation between the Shah and Prime Minister
Mossadeq began to erode, Behbahani took an active role in
rallying support for the Shah and promoting opposition to
Mossadeq through the creation and utilization of powerful street
demonstrations.49 While Behbahani’s close relationship with the
Shah and the power he could offer may have been enough to impel
him to rally Southern Tehran into action, the payments he received
from the CIA assured it. Behbahani also had the support of fellow
clerics such as his son-in-law Ayatollah Bahaeddin Nouri and
Seyyed Jalaleddin Firouzabadi. 50
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The final critical member of the Ulama with CIA ties was
also a close friend and ally of Ayatollah Behbahani, the powerful
preacher by the name of Sheikh Mohammad Taqi Falsafi. Falsafi
held strong influence with the traditional classes within Iran. A
longstanding opponent of both Mossadeq and Kashani, Falsafi
would eventually ally himself with Kashani based on their shared
anti-Mossadeq views. He was staunchly anti-Communist and used
the pulpit to spread anti-Mossadeq propaganda, which suggested
that Mossadeq was paving the way for the Tudeh Party to take
power and implement Communism in Iran. Why was it though that
Falsafi was so adamantly anti-Mossadeq and what motivated him
to sway the masses towards the Prime Minister’s overthrow? This
was largely due to Mossadeq’s strong stance in favor of
nationalism, and in Falsafi’s eyes this diminished the religiosity of
the Iranian population. Falsafi was also angered by Mossadeq’s
beliefs regarding free press, since this allowed for the Communist
Tudeh Party to publish openly.51 Finally, much like his friend
Ayatollah Behbahani, Falsafi’s moral obligation as a member of
the Ulama did not carry enough weight to deter him from
accepting bribes and corruption. In his book Unseating Mossadeq:
The Configuration and Role of Domestic Forces, Fakhreddin
Azimi describes how, “Falsafi generally had a reputation for
willingness to adjust his fluctuating political allegiances for
tangible gains.”52 This became clear when Falsafi began accepting
CIA money in return for using his political and religious influence
to mobilize the masses against Mohammad Mossadeq and to
destabilize the National Front.53
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US Government and CIA Activities within Iran
Claud H. Corrigan, member of the CIA’s History Staff provides
the CIA’s most blatant admission of guilt to date in his detailed
history of the 1953 coup in Iran titled The Battle for Iran where he
states:
“The point that the majority of these accounts miss
is a key one: the military coup that overthrew
Mosadeq and his National Front cabinet was carried
out under CIA direction as an act of U.S. foreign
policy, conceived and approved at the highest levels
of government. It was not an aggressively simplistic
solution, clandestinely arrived at but was instead an
official admission by both the United States and
United Kingdom that normal, rational methods of
international communication and commerce had
failed. TPAJAX was entered into as a last resort.”54
Kermit Roosevelt, head of the CIA’s Near East and Africa
Division and grandson of US President Theodore Roosevelt, was
selected by President Eisenhower, CIA Director Dulles, as well as
the British MI6 and given complete authority to command and
carry out the overthrow and removal of Mossadeq in Tehran by
any means necessary. Along with the British, and other US
operatives, Kermit Roosevelt and the CIA used a plethora of
techniques to influence Iran’s bureaucrats, clerics, merchants,
workers, criminals, religious community, and the remainder of the
masses, in an effort to shift their views regarding Mossadeq, in as
negative a way as possible, in order to undermine the massive
amount of power he held in Iran at the time. Long before
Roosevelt and the CIA had arrived in Iran, the British had been
building a large network of inside agents, including key figures
54
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such as the powerful Rashidyan Brothers, prominent businessmen
and pro-British loyalists, who they could rely on for key
intelligence information, to disseminate propaganda, and to help
influence and mobilize the masses when needed.55 However, once
the British had been ousted by Mossadeq in October 1952, they
were forced to share the identities of their inside agents with the
US and had to rely on the Americans to carry out the groundwork
while Britain assisted behind the scenes. The CIA built some of
their own relationships once in Iran but most of the key players
that the CIA would utilize in the removal of Mossadeq were apart
of Britain’s vast network of insiders. Many of the covert
techniques and dealings that were used by the CIA can be found
throughout Claud Corrigan’s Battle for Iran, CIA Historian and
head coup propagandist Dr. Donald Wilber’s Clandestine Service
History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran – November
1952-August 1953, CIA History Staff member Scott A Koch’s
“Zendebad, Shah!”:The Central Intelligence Agency and the Fall
of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq, August 1953,
along with the newly declassified top-secret CIA documents and
British Memorandums from the Foreign Relations of the United
States 1952-1954, Iran, 1951-1954, Volume X, titled Persia:
Political Review of the Recent Crisis," September 2, 1953 which
lie at the heart of this core analysis.
The main focus and foundation of my analysis will rely on
Dr. Donald Wilber’s Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran
which provides a contemporary first-hand account of the actions
that were taken by the CIA, including its alliance with the ulama,
the details regarding how many of those actions were carried out,
as well as context for the thinking that motivated them. While
Wilber’s work provides an abundance of important information
regarding the 1953 coup in Iran, it must be understood that a good
portion of the original text is still redacted, therefore we do not
55
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have all the details and certain aspects must be logically pieced
together from information gathered from other primary documents
and the many works of past scholars specializing in this field.
Corrigan’s Battle for Iran and Koch’s Zenbedad Shah! will share
the important role of helping to fill in any gaps found within
Wilber’s work, as well as to help confirm or deny the details
Wilber offers.
Once the US government and the CIA had come to the
conclusion that they would commit completely to Mossadeq’s
removal by any means necessary, CIA Director Allen Dulles
approved a $1,000,000 budget on April 4, 1953 “which could be
used by the Tehran Station in any way that would bring about the
fall of Mossadeq.”56 According to Wilber, one of the very first
aims of the CIA and ways in which they chose to allocate this
money was to steadily intensify their anti-Mossadeq and pro-Shah
propaganda.57 They wanted to saturate the country as quickly and
effectively as possible through a multi-layered approach by
targeting the population religiously, politically, economically and
socially. “In Iran, CIA and SIS propaganda assets were to conduct
an increasingly intensified propaganda effort through press,
handbills, and the Tehran clergy in a campaign designed to weaken
the Mossadeq government in any way possible.”58 The United
States government then went on to have some of their high-ranking
officials make public statements that made clear that American
economic aid would not be given to Iran as long as Mossadeq was
in power. This was done with the goal to diminish any confidence
the people of Iran had in Mossadegh and to eliminate the idea that
he was on good terms with the US and had the country’s
support.5960
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Wilber’s report continues on to explain how the CIA
played a crucial role in choosing who was to replace Mossadeq
once he was out of the way. General Fazlollah Zahedi, who had
previously been a member of Mossadeq’s cabinet, was seen as the
best choice to step in as Iran’s new Prime Minister. This was due
to Zahedi being the only reputable figure in Iran who had
consistently spoken out in opposition to Mossadeq and at the same
time had a large enough following to permit his new upcoming
position as prime minister.61 While supporting Zahedi had its
faults, such as his a pro-German stance during WWII, he had a
solid record as a leader and combat officer, was staunchly devoted
to the Shah, and he had an “aggressive desire to change the course
of his country’s destiny.”62 The CIA went on to approach Zahedi
personally and explain their goal of implementing him as the new
prime minister along with orders that he was to name a new
military secretariat, at which point the CIA would provide a
“detailed staff plan of action.”63 While the CIA had chosen the
man they wished to place as Iran’s new Prime Minister, they also
knew that this would not be possible without the cooperation of the
Shah. The Shah’s support would provide two requisite actions that
were necessary to carry out a smooth transition between Mossadeq
and Zahedi: the first was to ensure the backing of the Tehran
military garrisons, and the second was to provide for the legal
succession of Zahedi as Prime Minister.64 The only glaring issue
with this plan of action was that the Shah of Iran was an indecisive,
timid, and fearful man who was deathly scared of the repercussions
of a failed coup attempt that he was complicit in.
These tactics are remarkably similar to the regime change efforts by the United
States in Venezuela in 2019. The U.S. continues to utilize economic warfare
through the use of sanctions, along with the threat of direct military intervention,
in order to oust the democratically elected President Nicolas Maduro and to
replace him with a more U.S. friendly leader in Juan Guiado.
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It was no secret to the CIA or US government that the Shah
would not be so easily persuaded to go along with the coup due to
this specific set of character traits. Therefore, the CIA took it upon
themselves to call on the Shah’s much more confident and
aggressive twin sister, Princess Ashraf Pahlavi, for some assistance
in coercing her brother to fall in line with the joint US-British
plans. The Princess was brought in reluctantly from Europe back to
Tehran to push the Shah towards the removal of Mossadeq as
prime minister and to make clear that she had been communicating
with the US and the British who had requested her support on this
matter. The Central Intelligence officials also decided to try to
persuade the Shah into participation by setting up a visit from
General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who the Shah knew personally
and had grown to like and respect. It was Schwarzkopf’s job to
explain the upcoming plans of the CIA and to guide the Shah
towards signing three firmans (royal decrees), which would
provide the needed legal basis for the new change in government.65
66
The first firman was meant to dismiss Mossadeq from office, the
second was to appoint General Zahedi as his successor, and the
third to call for the Army to stay loyal to the Shah. Through their
agents in the Tehran military, the CIA made as certain as possible,
the support of the Army for the Shah and for the acceptance of
General Zahedi as prime minister.67 However, Corrigan’s history
shows that Kermit Roosevelt lowered the number of firmans to be
signed by the Shah from three to two. The first to dismiss
Mossadeq from his position as Prime Minister and the second
would name Zahedi as his successor. The information in the
paragraph following this section has been completely redacted.68
Claud Corrigan provides what looks to be two pages of a
roughly handwritten, hard to read outline of the plans for the coup
65
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following page 25 in his CIA history titled The Battle for Iran.
While there is no mention made by Corrigan explaining exactly
what these pages are, the nature of these pages becomes quite clear
after reading them through. The pages are numbered and lettered in
common outline form and touch on most of the major players that
participated in the coup. It begins with an “Introduction” followed
by a section titled “Operational Plan.” The first subtopic is titled
“Preliminary Support” and is followed by “Role of the Shah.” This
shows that from the very beginning the CIA was fully aware that
the coup would not be possible without the cooperation of the Shah
as he would be the linchpin of the entire operation that would help
carry public opinion and sway the masses. The “Role of the Shah”
passage is followed by three subtopics titled “First Stage, Second
Stage, Third Stage,” showing that the CIA planned for a steadily
increasing effort to persuade the Shah into joining the plans. This
may relate to the fact that US/British Intelligence knew the Shah to
be a timid and very indecisive man who would need some rather
strong coaxing. Section “C” is titled “Arrangement with Zahedi”
making clear that they knew he was their choice for replacement
from the very beginning. The following Section “D” has the title
of “Organ to Mount Overthrow” followed by “Organ to Mount
Coup” which openly suggest Zahedi was the man who the
operation would rely on to take power once Mossadeq was gone.
The document moves on to include Zahedi’s military
secretariat position followed by his duties and the “Actions on
Coup Day”. The outline continues by listing the influential sectors
of Tehran, laying out all the different groups who would need to be
included in the plan for a successful coup to take place. These
groups include “press and publicity,” “the Majlis,” “Political
Elements,” “Bazaar Merchants” and most importantly for this
study “Religious Leaders.” The documents end with a “Final
Action” section and lastly a section titled “Estimate of Chances.”
While this document is only a barebones outline, it does help to
confirm the actions taken by the CIA during the coup, as the
outline aligns almost perfectly with all of the sectors of society that
we now know the CIA worked to influence in order to oust Prime
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Minister Mossadeq.69 Corrigan later refers to the assumptions that
the plan was based upon: that Zahedi was the best option for coup
leader, the Shah must be a part of the plan (against his will if
necessary), that the Army would follow the Shah, a legal or quasilegal basis must be found for the coup, that public opinion must be
negatively aroused against Mossadeq, (next sentence excised), and
finally that the new government must be protected from the
Communist Tudeh Party.70 These assumptions provide context and
direct insight into the CIA’s thinking process and planning
procedures concerning the coup operation.
It was not until the beginning of July 1, 1953 that the
Director of the MI6, the British Foreign Secretary, and the British
Prime Minister signed off on the official operation plans for the
coup.71 Then, finally on July 11, 1953 the Director of the CIA, the
Secretary of State, and President Eisenhower approved the final
plans which was an action based on National Security Council
Report 136/1 “U.S. Policy Regarding the Present Situation in
Iran.”72 Prior to this official authorization however, the Tehran
station was continuing it’s covert activities and gained
authorization to spend one million rials per week, which at the time
was at a rate of 1 US dollar for every 90 rials ($90,000 USD), in
order to purchase the support and cooperation of the members of
the Majlis. Around this same time one of the two main groups
within the CIA, who were working together but on different areas
on the project of the coup, put together an exhaustive military plan,
which was given to Zahedi and his military secretariat, providing
them a detailed roadmap for action.73 In fact, the CIA was so well
prepared that they had three separate plans of actions depending on
the different scenarios that could potentially play out.74 The second
group within the CIA, which was headed by Dr. Donald Wilber
69
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(the author of this document), was given the responsibility of
carrying out the psychological warfare portion of the plan. 75
To further degrade the level of respect and trust the people
of Iran felt towards Mossadeq, the US government orchestrated a
series of three publications and speeches that were meant to
diminish his public standing. The first of this series of publications,
released July 9, 1953, was a copy of President Eisenhower’s letter
written to Dr. Mossadeq on June 29, 1953 which made it explicit
that increased economic aid for Iran would not be provided to help
with the loss of Iran’s oil sales due to British blockades. The
second publication came from the Secretary of State’s press
conference on July 28, 1953, where the US stated that the growth
and toleration of the activities of Iran’s Communist Tudeh Party
made it almost impossible for any further US aid or assistance.76
This was intended negatively affect US public opinion regarding
Mossadeq as well as to shape international views of the situation.
Finally, President Eisenhower gave a speech in Seattle at the
Governor’s convention where he stated that, “the United States
would not sit by and see Asian countries fall behind the Iron
Curtain.”77 This speech would prove to have a significant effect on
the situation in Iran. The CIA, in cooperation with the Department
of State, created and published several articles in major American
newspapers and magazines, which they knew would be reproduced
in Iran. The reproduction of these scripted articles would carry
heavy influence over the opinions of Iran’s population and would
help to slightly loosen the grip Mohammad Mossadeq held over his
people.
The CIA knew that outside propaganda, press publications,
royal decrees, and pressure on the Shah would not be nearly
enough to carry their plans to fruition. Knowing this, they turned to
their human assets present in Iran, and more specifically the assets
that the British had built strong relationships with over the years,
who held powerful influence over many large sectors or Iranian
75
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society. The CIA and the SIS had many contacts and inside agents
within Iran. Due to their willingness to oppose the power of
Mossadeq in any way they could, even at their own expense and
while risking their own lives, there were perhaps none who were as
important throughout Iranian society as the three Rashidyan
brothers.78 Saifollah, Qodratollah, and Asadollah had amassed a
huge family fortune through shipping, real estate, banking, among
numerous other business ventures including owning and operating
cinemas.79 The Rashidyan family had strong contacts in many
areas including: the Majlis (parliament), armed forces, the press,
the Ulama, politicians, street gangs, as well as other influential
figures in Iran.80 Under the British, the brothers had been
receiving a monthly payment of ten thousand British pounds in
order to influence the bazaar merchants as well as to have antiMossadeq articles regularly published in the newspapers.81 The
actions of the aforementioned Rashidyan brothers proved to be
highly effective in creating a negative image of, and building
popular support against, Mossadeq through bribery of other
influential figures as well as through their financing of protesters to
carry out violent street demonstrations. The CIA also utilized the
Rashidyan brother’s connections with the press to begin releasing
“grey propaganda,” which attacked Mossadeq but would not credit
the source or identify the sponsor of the information. Wilber does
mention that the CIA had two of their own principal Iranian agents,
whose information was to be shared with the British, but the names
of these two agents have been redacted from Wilber’s account.82
Wilber recounts that by mid-July 1953 a large number of
anti-Mossadeq articles had been written by or at least outlined by
his group. They had also provided constant guidance to the CIA
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Art Group so that they could create a considerable number of antiMossadeq cartoons and broadsheets.83

Illustration titled, "Mossadeq, the Thief."84
The goal here was to focus on building the size and potency of
anti-Mossadeq forces, instead of merely countering those who
supported him.85 The CIA Art Group was also commissioned to
draw a wall poster that portrayed Zahedi being presented to the
people of Iran by the Shah. The propaganda began to stack up very
rather quickly and was then taken to Iran, where on July 22, 1953
it was distributed to CIA and SIS agents to be used throughout all
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the avenues of the press which the CIA had control over.86 It is
now known that the CIA held influence over four-fifths of the
newspapers in Tehran of which they were able to make very
effective use of in many different ways.87 The Tehran Station
claimed that about 20 local newspapers “were now in violent
opposition to Mossadeq.”88 Wilber goes on to explain that the
CIA’s propaganda efforts took another turn as the anti-Mossadeq
campaign had already gained traction and was now building steam.
Instead of strictly releasing articles and cartoons that attacked
Mossadeq, they made a push to disseminate articles and cartoons
that supported and positively portrayed the Shah. The CIA
provided a personal loan of $45,000 to the owner of a newspaper,
whose name and newspaper title have been redacted, in hopes that
this would make him more conformable to their efforts. Asadollah
Rashidyan was given the propaganda which had been prepared by
CIA agents, who then passed the articles along to his press
connections, and by the end of the month the new campaign was
up and running.89
After being pressured so strongly by his own sister and
after several personal meetings with Kermit Roosevelt, the
pressure had become so forceful that it was easier for the Shah to
sign the royal firmans, which he did on August 15, 1953, than it
would have for him to refuse.90 The coup was planned for the very
next day. However, the information contained in the plans had
been leaked to Mossadeq, who began to prepare. When the Shah’s
bodyguard arrived to arrest Mossadeq, he was outnumbered and
overpowered by military forces that were loyal to the prime
minister and the coup failed. Knowing that this was a possibility,
the CIA had arranged a protected hiding place for General Zahedi.
The Shah had also decided to leave Iran for Baghdad, as he
thought he would not survive if he stayed in the country. With the
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help of a secret CIA arranged press conference and through covert
CIA printing facilities, on August 17, 1953 General Zahedi
announced to the people of Iran that he was now their legal prime
minister and that Mossadeq had tried to carry out an illegal coup
against him. Agents of the CIA began sending out large numbers
of photographs of the firmans stating that Mossadeq had been
dismissed from his position and that Zahedi was now prime
minister.91

Mohammad Reza Shah (right) shaking hands with General
Zahedi (left). 92
This propaganda worked precisely as it was intended and very
seriously affected the views of the Iranian people. Iranian citizens
were angered and shocked at what they were hearing and at the
fact that the Shah had been forced to flee the country and was
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exiled to Italy for some time.93 Kermit Roosevelt and the CIA did
not believe that the coup was lost, so they contacted the Shah and
encouraged him to make public statements that would encourage
the Army and the Iranian population to accept Zahedi as their new
prime minister.94
After the first coup attempt, which was shut down by
Mossadeq’s supporters including the Communist Tudeh Party, and
after Mossadeq himself received leaked information about it, the
CIA’s Tehran station had to reexamine their plans before moving
on with the second attempt.95 The CIA no longer saw the operation
as a military coup, but rather as a political action to help move the
Iranian military away from Mossadeq’s now illegal government
and place them behind Zahedi and the Shah. Roosevelt, with the
Shah’s signed firmans, knew that he had two very powerful pieces
of paper in hand and knew that if he could publicize and
disseminate this information quickly that Mossadeq would not be
able to hold on to his power for long.96 They also knew that they
would need a much larger support group from the local military
units, local tribal leaders, and the religious community if they
intended to be successful this time. The CIA sent an Iranian
Colonel (name excised) to meet with Colonel (name excised), who
was the commanding officer of a local garrison, in hopes of
persuading him to declare his support for the Shah. Zahedi, along
with another CIA agent were sent to meet a Brigadier General,
again whose name is not provided, to request his support for the
Shah as well. Following these requests for support, the CIA once
again stepped up its propaganda efforts by sending guidance to the
stations in Karachi, New Delhi, Cairo, Damascus, Istanbul, and
93
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Beirut, stating that General Zahedi’s government is now the only
legal one in Iran.97 Corrigan tells us that the CIA had their plan of
action for the second attempt already arranged. The idea was to
recruit a group of officers in key positions that would enable them
to take over army headquarters, Radio Tehran, the homes of
Mossadeq and his associates, police headquarters, the telephone
exchange, the Majlis building, along with a handful of other key
locations and the arrests of prominent pro-Mossadeq figures in the
military, government, and the press.98 The Tehran Station received
news from Kermanshah on August 18, 1953 that would greatly
help their cause. Colonel Abbas Farzanegan had returned with
news that Colonel Bakhtiar had agreed to march on Tehran to
support the Shah and oppose Mossadeq.99 With these important
posts locked down and key figures in on the plot, the coup was
sure to be a success. Roosevelt, the CIA, and Zahedi now felt that
they were prepared with enough support to come back and carry
out a successful coup against Mossadeq.
Strong signs of reemerging support for the Shah in Tehran
spurred along by the CIA propaganda had now become obvious.100
According to Wilber, a pro-Shah demonstration originated in the
bazaar area of Tehran on August 19, 1953,“partially spontaneously
revealing the fundamental prestige of the Shah…”101 While a proShah demonstration did break out, whether it was spontaneous and
due to the “fundamental prestige of the Shah” is unlikely as many
pro-Shah and anti-Mossadeq demonstrations were created and led
by CIA operatives, religious clerics, political parties, and through a
handful of other influential groups or leaders who were being paid
for and/or were paying others for their participation. Wilber does
go on to mention that certain assets from the CIA’s station in
Tehran contributed to the start of the pro-Shah demonstrations,
which seems to be in keeping with what is known regarding paid
97
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demonstrations. The CIA ordered their sub-agents to gather their
paid followers and begin taking over key locations. Their first stop
was to set fire to the offices of the Bakhtar-i-Emruz, a leading
newspaper which was anti-Shah and strongly pro-Mossadeq. They
moved on to ransack the offices of the leading Tudeh newspapers
as well. The Rashidyan brothers were then told to call for their
followers to take over Radio Tehran, which they later did
successfully. Members of the Iranian Zuhrkhaneh (House of
Strength a traditional Persio-Islamic gym), including acrobats,
weightlifters, and wrestlers were at the head of the masses. They
had specifically chosen Shaban Bimohk (the Brainless) Jaffari,
Iran’s most famous athlete to lead the crowd, which created an
absolute frenzy. The people of Iran idolized the athletes of the
Zuhrkhaneh in a similar manner to the American idolization of
football, baseball, and basketball players. Therefore, this was a
very effective move on behalf of the CIA and the Rashidyan
brothers to play on Iranian popular culture to promote their
participation in the coup.102 Then a leading Colonel, whose name
has been redacted, took control of a tank, along with members of
the disbanded Imperial Guard, took over trucks and began driving
through the streets and came together at Sepah Square in
Tehran.103
The demonstrators soon came face to face with the Army
units in Tehran whose job it was to disperse them. The soldiers
began firing hundreds of warning shots over the crowds.104 The
troops finally realized they could not quell the crowds and refused
to fire on their people and so joined the pro-Shah demonstrations
making it clear that the Shah’s supporters had taken over Tehran.
This set the stage for the CIA’s original course of action for
carrying out the coup. The crowds then took over the press and
propaganda offices, along with the central telegraph office. CIA
operatives used control over the telegraph offices to send telegrams
to the provinces to call for the people to stand up in support of the
102
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Shah.105 Radio Tehran was now the main target as this was the
fastest and most far-reaching way to spread the news that the
Shah’s troops were now in Tehran and to convince the people of
Iran to support Zahedi’s government.106 Understanding their
control over the situation, the CIA station then prompted Zahedi to
come out of hiding and continue with the CIA’s original plans with
the Shah’s signed firmans in hand. Zahedi was picked up by a tank
and driven to Radio Tehran headquarters to broadcast a reading of
the Shah’s firmans and to declare that the government was now
his.107 Zahedi, with CIA asset assistance, then took over the offices
of the General Staff, they seized Mossadeq’s home, searched then
trashed the place, and finally they arrested all of the pro-Mossadeq
politicians and officers.108 It was now official, as of August 19,
1953 that General Fazlollah Zahedi was the new Prime Minister of
Iran.
Upon hearing that the coup was successful the Shah
remarked, “I knew my people loved me.”109 Dr. Wilber explains
that the Shah soon returned to Iran where he received a warm and
popular reception from the Iranian people. It seems that the Shah
was moved emotionally by this response and the fact that his
people and the Army had stood up to Dr. Mossadeq and had
revolted against the Communist Tudeh Party. According to Wilber,
this was the first time in the Shah’s life that he felt that he had the
total support of Iran’s population as well as the Army.110 While the
Shah was basking in his newfound glory and success, he was well
aware of the fact that none of this would have been possible
without the help of Kermit Roosevelt and the CIA. According to
Roosevelt, the Shah proclaimed that ““I owe my throne to God, my
people, my army and to you!” By ‘you’ he (the Shah) meant me
105
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and the two countries—Great Britain and the United States—I was
representing. We were all heroes.”111 With all of this done, the
CIA’s work was not yet complete. In order to help Zahedi succeed
and continue to pay his staff until the United States government
could provide large-scale aid, the CIA covertly provided Zahedi
with $5,000,000 within two days of his supposition of power.112
Kermit Roosevelt and the CIA had successfully organized,
orchestrated, and carried out the first overthrow of a government
using covert operations in the CIA’s history, which would
drastically change the course of Iran’s and the world’s history
forever.113 Moreover, As Claud Corrigan so casually puts it
regarding the state of Iran after the coup: “A successful TPAJAX
left behind a good deal of debris to clean up, plus not a few
complications.”114
The Role of the CIA and Iran’s Ulama
While understanding the CIA’s actions and level of involvement in
the 1953 coup in Iran is crucial to understanding US, British, and
Iranian history, as well as current US-Iranian relations, this is a
history that has been very thoroughly examined and studied by
many of the top scholars in this field. What has not been detailed to
a sufficient extent is the of the role of Iran’s religious clerics in the
coup and their relationships and interactions with the CIA, and the
effect that their cooperation had on the coup’s final outcome. This
will offer a much more nuanced understanding of the 1953 coup in
Iran and will also provide additional context from which to view
the events that occurred. The plans carried out here will also shed
light on the inner workings and guidelines that can be used to carry
out a coup in almost any society, but more importantly will expose
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the role played by Iran’s own religious leaders in ousting their
democratically elected prime minister.
While the many different groups who worked in
cooperation with the CIA or under the influence of their subagents
played key roles in the 1953 coup, and without a doubt facilitated
its outcome, there was no single group who had a more crucial role
than the Ulama. I argue that there was no single group who had the
potential to play such a key role in these events as did Iran’s
religious elite. This is because no other sector of Iran’s society
could possibly hold the power and influence over the masses like
the country’s clerics. Relied upon as spiritual leaders and
interpreters the Quran and hadith, as well serving as custodians of
most of Iran’s social welfare systems, it is no wonder that the
influence of the Iranian clerics was far greater than any other group
involved. Having studied Iran’s history thoroughly and having had
years of experience within Iran’s culture, and MI6 held a deep
understanding of the Ulama’s role in Iranian society, which they
relayed to their CIA counterparts thus playing upon the
weaknesses and cultural norms within Iran and placed an
enormous amount of focus on gaining the cooperation of some of
Iran’s highest-level clerics.
Dr. Donald Wilber’s account shows that from the start the
CIA knew they wanted to target Iran’s Ulama. Wilber states that
the funds provided by the CIA were meant to carry out an
“increasingly intensified propaganda effort” through use of the
local media, the passing out of pamphlets, and through the “Tehran
Clergy” in an effort to diminish the power of the Mossadeq’s
government.115 Corrigan’s history also provides evidence that the
Ulama were a CIA target from the beginning with the handwritten
coup outline/plan he provided that lists “Religious Leaders.”116
There were many instances where members of the Ulama were
used or participated in actions geared towards swaying the
thoughts of Iran’s public. The first to be examined is an instance
115
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offered by Dr. Wilber which suggests that when Dr. Mossadeq
dissolved the Majlis, which they considered a clear abuse of the
constitution in order to gain single-handed control, this gave the
CIA an issue over which they could attack Mossadeq. The Tehran
Station of the CIA reported that their agents made numerous
efforts to project the illegality of the dissolution of the Majlis both
before and after it took place. Wilber comments that every
declaration made by religious clerics during this time strongly
stressed this idea. While he does not explicitly say that these
religious leaders were acting in line with CIA guidelines, it is
understood that many of the religious clerics were under CIA
influence and were following their themes. So, while this particular
instance may be mere coincidence, it is likely not.117
Prior to the first coup attempt, the CIA set out to discredit
the people’s belief in Mossadeq. Their first goal was to create
divisions within the National Front Party by targeting the popular
Ayatollah Kashani. The CIA began spreading propaganda that
attacked Kashani directly in order to create problems between
himself and Mossadeq. For examples, they issued a cartoon in
Iranian newspapers during the fall of 1952 implying that Mossadeq
was sexually molesting Kashani. The propaganda did indeed help
to create a gap between the two as Kashani began to turn on
Mossadeq by the fall of 1952, and had broken ties with him in
early 1953.118 This was a major blow for Mossadeq because the
group that Kashani led, known as the Warriors of Islam, included
the bazaar merchants along with many of the leading clerics and
support from these two groups together has been vital to Iranian
governments throughout history.119 This quote from the memoirs
of Prince Manucher Farmanfarmaian, sixth son of one of the most
prominent politicians of his time the Qajar Prince Abdol-Hossein
117

CIA, "Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran,” 32.
Gasiorowski, “The 1953 Coup D'Etat Against Mosaddeq,” 243-244.
Information comes from interviews with K. Roosevelt and interviews with CIA
operatives who were involved in the coup. Some information comes from
endnotes discussing the interviews
119
CIA, “Zendebad, Shah!” 7.
118

149

Iranian Ulama and the CIA

Farmanfarma, paints a picture of the powerful relationship between
the two and illustrates their influence: “It (the bazaar) was a world
unto itself, impregnable to the army, which could not easily enter
its labyrinthine alleys. The leaders of the bazaar were weighty
men, often tightly allied with the mollahs, and they could start riots
or shut down the bazaar to instant political effect.”120
Due to this split, Kashani and his followers began voting
against Mossadeq in parliament and created a deadlock on many
cases, limiting Mossadeq’s power for a time. The CIA also wanted
to gain the cooperation of another leader outside of the National
Front and began giving money indirectly to Ulama member
Mohammad Taqi Falsafi, and likely to other leading clerics as
well. Although the CIA was not able to make direct contact with
Kashani, they were able to fund him indirectly. Around this time it
is also likely that the Tehran Station provided money to the leading
cleric Ayatollah Mohammad Behbahani, who played a
monumental role in the coup.121 Behbahani’s role started well
before the street demonstrations as he supposedly wrote and sent
out “black” letters, under the pretense that they had been sent by
members of the Tudeh Party, to other clergy members threatening
to hang them in the streets.122 This was intended to build popular
support amongst the religious community against Mossadeq and
the Tudeh party.
In the weeks leading up to the first coup attempt the CIA
had their Iranian agents make “black” phone calls to many clerical
leaders throughout Tehran, which were incredibly threatening in
nature, in the name of the Tudeh Party. They also conducted a
“sham bombing” at one of the mullah’s personal homes, which
was followed up by sending a “stink bomb” into a Tehran mosque.
The CIA were likely responsible for attacks that took place on
other mosques as well but there are no official records to support
this. The aim here was to continue to try to turn the religious
120
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leaders against Mossadeq, in order to make use of the incredible
influence they held over the population.123 Following the failure of
the first coup attempt, the CIA made an attempt to reach out to the
leading Shi’a cleric from Qom, Ayatollah Borujerdi, by sending a
Tehran cleric (name excised) in an effort to persuade him to
declare a holy war against the all communists in Iran with the proShah newspapers ready and waiting to issue the story immediately.
He was also asked to build a large demonstration based on the
theme that it was now time for the army officers, soldiers and the
people of Iran to rally behind both religion and the Shah.124 While
he never agreed to issue such a declaration this shows yet another
effort by the CIA to include a leading cleric in the coup.125
However, there is conclusive evidence that shows the CIA working
directly with members of Tehran’s Ulama regarding when to stage
the coup. In The Battle For Iran, Claud Corrigan explains:
Roosevelt had hoped that it would be possible to
emphasize the religious aspects of the
demonstration to be held the 19th, but if this was to
be done, the mullahs wanted to hold it on Friday, 21
August, which was a religious festival day. For a
number of reasons, not the least of which was the
widespread rumor that the arrested officers were to
be hung on the 20th, the operation could not be held
off the two extra days the religious leaders
wanted.126
The names of the clerics that Corrigan is referring to are not
offered but may very well be included in the redacted portions that
immediately precede and follow this passage. This quote once
again confirms how seriously the CIA took the influence of the
clerics, as they made sure to place emphasis on the religious aspect
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of these demonstrations knowing that this would inflame the
crowds far more than any political protest ever could.
On the morning of August 19, 1953, two CIA officers
delivered $10,000 dollars to one of Kashani’s men to pass along
for Kashani to use as payment for protestors to create and
participate in street demonstrations that were both anti-Mossadeq
and pro-Shah in form.127 Corrigan confirms that many of the street
demonstrators on this day were those that Kashani was paying 200
tomans (about $26.65) each for their participation.128 While
Kashani received large amounts of money from the CIA, the
operatives claim that Behbahani was the leading figure behind the
demonstrations and he himself had received large amounts of
funds from the Tehran Station.129 He had actually received so
much money that the expression “Behbahani dollars” was even
used many years after to refer to the money that was used to hire
the street demonstrators.130 During an interview one CIA member
recalls how “so much American currency found its way into
Tehran’s black market during the coup that the exchange rate fell
from over one hundred rials to the dollar to under fifty”131 Koch
cements the fact that the Ulama were absolutely key in carrying
out the powerful demonstrations which came together and finally
toppled Mossadeq when he states:
[First line excised] the influence of the mullahs on
the demonstration was clear. Holy men had
galvanized many of the poor of South Tehran by
hammering on the themes that the Soviet-backed
Communists were taking over, the Shah was gone,
and Mossadeq was to blame. The streets of Tehran,
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which had belonged to the Tudeh 24 hours earlier,
now belonged to a different crowd.132
In March 2018 a British memorandum titled, “Persia: Review of
the Recent Crisis,” was released which provided a detailed account
of the events that occurred in Tehran between August 19th-21st.
This key document provides the entire list of events that took place
leading up to the powerful anti-Mossadeq and pro-Shah street
demonstrations in Tehran and the taking over of Mossadeq’s
personal residence the day of the coup. While this memorandum
contains a host of completely relevant and vital information
regarding the unfolding of the coup events, this is not what makes
this document so crucial. What makes it so important is a section,
which had been excised for security reasons until only recently,
and it is this section that provides irrefutable evidence that places
responsibility on members of the Tehran Ulama, specifically
naming Ayatollah Behbahani, for receiving US funds for their
complicity with the CIA in the 1953 coup. The recently released
passage states:
According to reliable reports received on 10th
August, the American Embassy had secretly handed
over large sums of money to certain influential
people, including AYATULLAH BIHBIHANI, the
well-known ecclesiastic. Certain sources in close
contact with General ZAHIDI stated that all plans
had been laid for a military Coup d/Etat, and that
the American Embassy was directing and
encouraging them in order to overthrow the
government. 133
The memorandum later names Behbahani specifically as being
solely responsible for the street demonstrations the day of the coup
132
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by saying that: “only the commanders of regiments, the Chief of
Police, and Ayatullah BIHBIHANI, who was responsible for
organizing demonstrations, knew of the plan, and the Tudeh had
therefore no chance of discovering the plot beforehand.”134 This
single document has confirmed what has long been assumed and
pieced together by scholars: that certain members of Iran’s
religious leadership, were without a doubt working hand in hand
with the US Central Intelligence Agency to take out their
democratically elected Prime Minister, in exchange for money and
the possibility of positions of political power. It must be made
clear however, that the complicity of the Ulama in the 1953 coup
was not widespread and was limited to a few key members. The
Iranian Ulama have a long history of anti-interventionist activity at
multiple points throughout Iranian history. One prominent example
was the actions taken by members of the Ulama in the successful
protest and boycott of the creation of a British monopoly on
Iranian tobacco in 1892 during the Tobacco Protest.135
Conclusion
Iran’s religious clerics enjoy overwhelming power and influence
over the majority of the Iranian population. This is the case for two
reasons. The first being Islam is a politico-religious system that
blends the realities of the secular world with the holy. The second
reason is the traditional role of the religious community in Shia
Islam who serve as interpreters of the Quran and hadith and
perform essential services for the community. For many Iranian
people, the word of their Ulama members is law and since there
were a significant number of these religious elites who were
involved in the coup, of which there may very well have been
more than we have record of, their contributions towards the
134
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outcome is immeasurable. I therefore conclude that the 1953 Coup
D’état in Iran would not have been possible without the direct
participation and complicity of Iran’s religious leaders backed by
the leadership, guidance, finances, and organizing abilities of the
United States Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA needed the
Ulama, just as much, if not more than the Ulama needed the CIA.
Were it not for the “grey” and “black” propaganda of the CIA,
financial bribes offered by them, the fake phone calls to the clerics
by the Tehran station, the destruction of certain Mosques, and the
creation of street demonstrations, all involving and motivating the
Ulama to act, the outcome in Iran may well have been a very
different one. Had the CIA not had the direct or indirect
cooperation of the Ulama in Iran, Mossadeq may have stayed in
power, the Shah may have never had the chance to become a
dictator much to the detriment of Iran’s people for 26 years. It is
then conceivable that the 1979 fundamentalist Iranian Revolution,
headed by Ayatollah Khomeini, would have never gained traction
or been necessary in the first place.
Perhaps the most valuable information that is provided
from studying the 1953 Iranian coup is the blueprint created by the
CIA and MI6 that would be replicated time and again the world
over. The CIA would go on to create a pattern of covert regime
change in countries all around the world. Starting in Guatemala
only one year later in 1954, the CIA began an operation known as
PBSUCCESS where they successfully removed the democratically
elected President Juan Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán and installed
military leadership which lead to the deaths of over 100,000
Guatemalan citizens.136 The CIA then moved on to the Congo in
1961 where they facilitated the removal of Prime Minister Patrice
Lumumba and the implementation of a pro-US leader.137 Then
again where the CIA took part in creating the conditions which
136
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lead to the 1973 Chilean coup which removed President Salvadore
Allende and replaced him with the brutal dictator Augusto
Pinochet.138 Indeed, as of early 2019, all the signs and symptoms
of US backed regime change are present yet once again in
Venezuela. The US continues to use economic warfare through
sanctions and by pressuring allies into not dealing with Venezuela
in order to force their hand, seemingly, and once again, for an
opportunity to control their most valuable resource: oil.
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